Warrant and action

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue that cases of warranted false belief speak in favor of (WA) and against the knowledge account. Moreover, I note some problems with an “excuse maneuver” that proponents of the knowledge account frequently invoke in response to cases of warranted false belief. Finally, I argue that (WA) may provide a strict invariantist account of cases that have been thought to motivate interest-relative or subject-sensitive theories of knowledge and warrant.
Original languageEnglish
JournalSynthese
Volume178
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)529–547
ISSN1111-4924
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

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Warrants
Deliberation
False Belief
Practical Rationality
Theory of Knowledge
Excuse

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Gerken, Mikkel. / Warrant and action. In: Synthese. 2011 ; Vol. 178, No. 3. pp. 529–547.
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Warrant and action. / Gerken, Mikkel.

In: Synthese, Vol. 178, No. 3, 2011, p. 529–547.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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