Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining

Christian M. Dahl, Christian Daniel le Maire, Jakob R. Munch

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

This article studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level influences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use detailed panel data covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identification of the effects of decentralization. We find a wage premium associated with firm-level bargaining relative to sector-level bargaining and that the return to skills is higher under the more decentralized wage-setting systems. Using quantile regression, we also find that wages are more dispersed under firm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Labor Economics
Volume31
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)501-533
ISSN0734-306X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Decentralization
Wage dispersion
Wage bargaining
Wages
Wage setting
Quantile regression
Premium
Workers
Labour market
Panel data

Keywords

  • QUANTILE REGRESSION PANEL-DATA INSTITUTIONS INEQUALITY EMPLOYMENT MODELS UNIONS

Cite this

Dahl, Christian M. ; le Maire, Christian Daniel ; Munch, Jakob R. . / Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining. In: Journal of Labor Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 31, No. 3. pp. 501-533.
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Wage Dispersion and Decentralization of Wage Bargaining. / Dahl, Christian M.; le Maire, Christian Daniel; Munch, Jakob R. .

In: Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2013, p. 501-533.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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