The scope of epistemic focal bias: response to Blome-Tillmann

Mikkel Gerken*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debateResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In this response to Michael Blome-Tillmann's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's epistemic focal bias account of the salient alternatives effect that Blome-Tillmann takes to motivate epistemic contextualism. First, I defend the epistemic focal bias account against Blome-Tillmann's criticism that it is insufficiently general insofar as it fails to account for a range of cases. Second, I defend the epistemic focal bias account from Blome-Tillmann's charge that it overgeneralizes insofar as it can ‘explain away the context-sensitivity of gradable adjectives.’ Along the way, I discuss the metaphilosophical principles that guide the epistemic focal bias account.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInquiry
ISSN0020-174X
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Keywords

  • epistemic contextualism
  • Focal bias
  • philosophical methodology

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