The electoral cycle in political contributions: the incumbency advantage of early elections

Lasse Aaskoven*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The occurrence of early elections varies significantly between and within electoral democracies. Previous studies have investigated the determinants and the electoral consequences of early elections. However, whether early elections affect financial contributions to political parties has not been independently studied. This article argues that incumbent government parties gain a relative advantage compared to non-government parties with regard to private contributions in years of early elections. This argument is tested using party-level data from Denmark. Taking party-fixed effects into account, the results show a strong incumbency advantage in private contributions for early elections. The findings suggest that the ability to call early elections gives incumbent parties an additional advantage besides being able to call elections when economic conditions and opinion polls are favorable.

Original languageEnglish
JournalActa Politica
Volume55
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)670-691
ISSN0001-6810
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Election timing
  • Elections
  • Incumbency advantage
  • Party finance
  • Political parties

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