Projects per year
Abstract
This article identifies value‐satiability sufficientarianism as a distinctive version of the sufficiency view, which has been ignored in the literature on distributive justice. This is unfortunate because value‐satiability sufficientarianism is much better equipped than alternative sufficiency views to cope with the standard objections against sufficiency. Most often, sufficientarianism refers to satiability as a feature of moral principles and reasons. But value‐satiability sufficientarianism also invokes satiability in the space of value‐theory, as it determines the sufficiency threshold at the point where justice‐relevant values have been completely fulfilled. The article gives examples of how this view is widely apparent in the literature, and it provides some reasons in its favour. It then presents the two standard objections against sufficientarianism – the threshold objection and the indifference objection – and argues that these critiques do not apply to value‐satiability sufficientarianism. The general argument of the article therefore proves sufficientarianism more difficult to refute than is commonly credited.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 5 |
Pages (from-to) | 800-816 |
ISSN | 0264-3758 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
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Sufficiency and Capability: On the ideal of distributive justice
Nielsen, L. (Head coordinator)
02/02/2015 → 13/05/2020
Project: Research
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VVS: Værdier, velfærd og sundhedskommunikation
Klausen, S. H. (Head coordinator), Nielsen, L. (CoI), Cenci, A. (CoI), Christensen, A.-M. S. (CoI), Christiansen, R. (CoI), Grund, C. M. (CoI), Emiliussen, J. (CoI), Engelsen, S. (CoI), Wolsing, P. (CoI) & Nielsen, T. H. (Project participant)
03/09/2018 → …
Project: Research