Abstract
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 5 |
Pages (from-to) | 800-816 |
ISSN | 0264-3758 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
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Sufficiency and Satiable Values. / Nielsen, Lasse.
In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2019, p. 800-816.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Sufficiency and Satiable Values
AU - Nielsen, Lasse
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - This article identifies value‐satiability sufficientarianism as a distinctive version of the sufficiency view, which has been ignored in the literature on distributive justice. This is unfortunate because value‐satiability sufficientarianism is much better equipped than alternative sufficiency views to cope with the standard objections against sufficiency. Most often, sufficientarianism refers to satiability as a feature of moral principles and reasons. But value‐satiability sufficientarianism also invokes satiability in the space of value‐theory, as it determines the sufficiency threshold at the point where justice‐relevant values have been completely fulfilled. The article gives examples of how this view is widely apparent in the literature, and it provides some reasons in its favour. It then presents the two standard objections against sufficientarianism – the threshold objection and the indifference objection – and argues that these critiques do not apply to value‐satiability sufficientarianism. The general argument of the article therefore proves sufficientarianism more difficult to refute than is commonly credited.
AB - This article identifies value‐satiability sufficientarianism as a distinctive version of the sufficiency view, which has been ignored in the literature on distributive justice. This is unfortunate because value‐satiability sufficientarianism is much better equipped than alternative sufficiency views to cope with the standard objections against sufficiency. Most often, sufficientarianism refers to satiability as a feature of moral principles and reasons. But value‐satiability sufficientarianism also invokes satiability in the space of value‐theory, as it determines the sufficiency threshold at the point where justice‐relevant values have been completely fulfilled. The article gives examples of how this view is widely apparent in the literature, and it provides some reasons in its favour. It then presents the two standard objections against sufficientarianism – the threshold objection and the indifference objection – and argues that these critiques do not apply to value‐satiability sufficientarianism. The general argument of the article therefore proves sufficientarianism more difficult to refute than is commonly credited.
U2 - 10.1111/japp.12364
DO - 10.1111/japp.12364
M3 - Journal article
VL - 36
SP - 800
EP - 816
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
SN - 0264-3758
IS - 5
ER -