Stability and cognitive architecture: response to Machery

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In this response to Edouard Machery's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I address his methodological challenges, the first of which concerns cross-cultural and interpersonal instability of case judgments. Whereas I agree with Machery about the importance of not going too quickly from folk epistemological judgments to epistemological theory, I argue against skepticism about such judgments. Machery's second challenge concerns my bias account of patterns of knowledge ascriptions. Whereas I agree with Machery that bias accounts should not be overgeneralized, I argue that the evidence he cites is consistent with the restricted applications of the book's bias accounts.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-9
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 24. Jun 2023


  • Philosophical methodology
  • cognitive architecture
  • intuitive judgments


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