Abstract
Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truthvalue of ascriptions that S knows that p—even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in philosophy of science. 1 Consequently, a central aim of the present chapter is to consider how the contemporary debates over pragmatic encroachment connect to philosophy of science. Here is the plot: In Section 2, I provide a general characterization of pragmatic encroachment theories and restrict the discussion to one branch of it. In Section 3, I compare and contrast scientific and non-scientific knowledge and note some trademark features of scientific knowledge that will be relevant for the subsequent discussion. In Section 4, I move from exposition to argument by presenting some cases that challenge pragmatic encroachment on scientific knowledge. In Section 5, I argue that a general argument contra pragmatic encroachment theories extends to compromise pragmatic encroachment accounts of scientific knowledge. In Section 6, I consider whether my arguments against pragmatic encroachment may be rebutted by embedding pragmatic encroachment in the anti-realist framework of constructive empiricism. In Section 7, I conclude by arguing that the challenges for pragmatic encroachment on scientific knowledge are grave and that they cast doubt on pragmatic encroachment generally.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology |
Editors | Brian Kim, Matthew McGrath |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Routledge |
Publication date | 2019 |
Edition | 1. |
Pages | 116-140 |
Chapter | 8 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138051829 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351685252 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |