Is Internalism about Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophia
Volume36
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)87-96
ISSN1314-5606
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

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Internalism
Content Externalism
Suspicion
Anti-individualism
Externalism
Incompatibilist
Compatibilist

Cite this

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title = "Is Internalism about Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism?",
abstract = "There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists.",
author = "Mikkel Gerken",
year = "2008",
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Is Internalism about Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism? / Gerken, Mikkel.

In: Philosophia, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2008, p. 87-96.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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AB - There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists.

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