Impermissible self-rationalizing pessimism: In defence of a pragmatic ethics of belief

Nikolaj Nottelmann, Boudewijn De Bruin

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Abstract

We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.
Original languageEnglish
JournalErkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy
ISSN0165-0106
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 4. Apr 2019

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Person
Beliefs
Ethics
Ethics of Belief
Pessimism
Evidence
Standards
Merit
Evidentialism
Pragmatism
Criticism

Cite this

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abstract = "We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.",
author = "Nikolaj Nottelmann and {De Bruin}, Boudewijn",
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Impermissible self-rationalizing pessimism: In defence of a pragmatic ethics of belief. / Nottelmann, Nikolaj; De Bruin, Boudewijn .

In: Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy, 04.04.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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AB - We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.

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