Happiness, Dispositions and the Self

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    I argue that happiness is an exclusively categorical mental state. Daniel Haybron’s inclusion of dispositions into his emotional state theory rests of a confusion of constituents of happiness in the narrow psychological sense with objects of prudential concern, to which obviously belong “mood propensities” and other dispositional states. I further argue that while it is probably correct to require of a constituent of happiness that it must in some sense be “deep” and belong to, or directly impact on, a persons’ self, the importance of depth may be overrated by the emotional state theory, which also ignores the possibility that mental states other than moods and emotions can be deep in the relevant sense.
    Translated title of the contributionLykke, tilbøjeligheder og selvet
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of Happiness Studies
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)995-1013
    Publication statusPublished - 2016

    Bibliographical note

    First online: 11 March 2015

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