Happiness, Dispositions and the Self

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I argue that happiness is an exclusively categorical mental state. Daniel Haybron’s inclusion of dispositions into his emotional state theory rests of a confusion of constituents of happiness in the narrow psychological sense with objects of prudential concern, to which obviously belong “mood propensities” and other dispositional states. I further argue that while it is probably correct to require of a constituent of happiness that it must in some sense be “deep” and belong to, or directly impact on, a persons’ self, the importance of depth may be overrated by the emotional state theory, which also ignores the possibility that mental states other than moods and emotions can be deep in the relevant sense.
Translated title of the contributionLykke, tilbøjeligheder og selvet
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Happiness Studies
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)995-1013
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Bibliographical note

First online: 11 March 2015

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