Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms

Cristian Litan, Francisco Marhuenda, Peter Sudhölter

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

5 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.
Original languageEnglish
JournalAnnals of Operations Research
ISSN0254-5330
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2018

Fingerprint

Equilibrium distribution
Game form
Nash equilibrium

Cite this

@article{f214cb28d6f64655be3375e8cff3c27e,
title = "Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms",
abstract = "We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.",
author = "Cristian Litan and Francisco Marhuenda and Peter Sudh{\"o}lter",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/s10479-018-2854-7",
language = "English",
journal = "Annals of Operations Research",
issn = "0254-5330",
publisher = "Springer",

}

Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms. / Litan, Cristian ; Marhuenda, Francisco; Sudhölter, Peter.

In: Annals of Operations Research, 2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms

AU - Litan, Cristian

AU - Marhuenda, Francisco

AU - Sudhölter, Peter

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.

AB - We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.

U2 - 10.1007/s10479-018-2854-7

DO - 10.1007/s10479-018-2854-7

M3 - Journal article

JO - Annals of Operations Research

JF - Annals of Operations Research

SN - 0254-5330

ER -