Abstract
This article presents a political and legal analysis of the emergency brake in criminal law in arts 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU. It suggests that the emergency brake offers a powerful discretionary prerogative for Member States seeking to protect the integrity of their criminal justice systems. This strong legal shield for Member States in the form of a “quasi-veto” is contrasted with a tendency to decision-making under the “shadow of the vote”, cautiously moving towards supranationalism. On the basis of general theories of Council decision-making and a comprehensive review of EU criminal law legislation adopted to date, the article argues that majority rule rather than general agreement appears to be the current driving force behind decision-making in EU criminal policy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | European Law Review |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Pages (from-to) | 506-530 |
| ISSN | 0307-5400 |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
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