Epistemic Entitlement – Its Scope and Limits

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    Abstract

    This chapter explores the nature of epistemic entitlement and its role in epistemology in relation to the epistemic internalism-externalism dispute. I argue for epistemic pluralism according to which the genus of epistemic rationality, warrant, harbors two distinct species: an internalist one, justification, and an externalist one, entitlement. On this basis, I advance a new criterion for drawing the distinction between justification and entitlement: The Reason Criterion: entitlements are warrants that do not involve the exercise of the faculty of Reason.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationEpistemic Entitlement
    EditorsPeter Graham, Nikolaj Pedersen
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Publication date19. Feb 2020
    Pages150-178
    Chapter4
    ISBN (Print)9780198713524
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 19. Feb 2020

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