Epistemic Entitlement – Its Scope and Limits

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Abstract

This chapter explores the nature of epistemic entitlement and its role in epistemology in relation to the epistemic internalism-externalism dispute. I argue for epistemic pluralism according to which the genus of epistemic rationality, warrant, harbors two distinct species: an internalist one, justification, and an externalist one, entitlement. On this basis, I advance a new criterion for drawing the distinction between justification and entitlement: The Reason Criterion: entitlements are warrants that do not involve the exercise of the faculty of Reason.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEpistemic Entitlement
EditorsPeter Graham, Nikolaj Pedersen
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date19. Feb 2020
Pages150-178
Chapter4
ISBN (Print)9780198713524
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19. Feb 2020

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