Envy, Levelling-Down, and Harrison Bergeron: Defending Limitarianism Against Three Common Objections

Lasse Nielsen*, David V, Axelsen

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

This paper discusses limitarianism in light of three popular objections to the redistribution of extreme wealth: (i) that such redistribution legitimizes envy, which is a morally objectionable attitude; (ii) that it disincentivizes the wealthy to invest and work, leading to a diminished social product, and, thereby, making everyone worse-off; and (iii) that it undercuts the pursuit and achievement of human excellence by depriving successful people of resources through which they may otherwise excel. We argue that these objections fail to undermine limitarianism. An elaborated defence against them, rather, reveals how the Standard Defence of limitarianism may be expanded and strengthened by relying explicitly on the importance of preventing a society of envy, avoiding harm to non-rich citizens, and ensuring that humans are given the opportunities to excel in ways that go beyond those that allow for the amassment of wealth.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume25
Issue number5
Pages (from-to)737-753
ISSN1386-2820
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2022

Keywords

  • Distributive justice
  • Extreme wealth
  • Limitarianism
  • Robeyns

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