Disagreement and Epistemic Injustice from a Communal Perspective

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    The paper is organized as follows: In Section 8.2, I characterize varieties of disagreement as well as the notion of epistemic peerhood. In Section 8.3, I consider a broad argument to the effect that disagreement may defeat or diminish epistemic warrant: The Argument from Self-Doubt. In Section 8.4, I argue that this negative impact of disagreement is more severe than is commonly recognized once we consider the effects of the disagreement at the level of the social group. In Section 8.5, I indicate how the noted epistemological problems with disagreement may breed epistemic injustice in the community. Finally, in Section 8.6, I briefly consider what measures a community may take in order to avoid the noted epistemological problems with disagreement.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Epistemology of Group Disagreement
    EditorsFernando Broncano-Berracal, J. Adam Carter
    Place of PublicationNew York
    Publication date2021
    ISBN (Electronic)9780429022500
    Publication statusPublished - 2021
    SeriesRoutledge Studies in Epistemology


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