Brogaard's Moral Contextualism

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Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to

account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically

clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims. The

moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about

the semantic workings of their own language. But, secondly, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism

looking weaker than a Mackie-style invariantist error theory about morals. The latter is

equally non-objectivist, but less revisionist, since it takes the semantics of moral discourse at face

value, and can also explain all of Brogaard's other linguistic evidence.

Original languageEnglish
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number232
Pages (from-to)410-416
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - 1. Jul 2008


  • Moral relativism
  • Contextualism
  • Metaethics


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