A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information

Andrés Salamanca*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Abstract

Several "value-like" solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Volume4
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)109-117
ISSN2399-844X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1. Nov 2019

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • Incomplete information
  • Non-transferable utility

Cite this

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title = "A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information",
abstract = "Several {"}value-like{"} solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.",
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A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information. / Salamanca, Andrés.

In: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol. 4, No. 1, 01.11.2019, p. 109-117.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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PY - 2019/11/1

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AB - Several "value-like" solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Incomplete information

KW - Non-transferable utility

U2 - 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.004

DO - 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.004

M3 - Journal article

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