What is wrong with sufficiency?

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Resumé

In this paper, I ask what is wrong with sufficiency. I formulate a generic sufficiency principle in relation to which I discuss possible problems for sufficientarianism. I argue against the arbitrariness-concern, that sufficiency theory need only to identify a possible space for determining a plausible threshold, and I argue against the high-low threshold dilemma concern, that multiple-threshold views can solve this dilemma. I then distinguish between currency-pluralist and currency-monist multiple-threshold views and test them against two different versions of the widely shared “ignorance of inequality objection” to sufficientarianism—a benefit-driven and a burden-driven version. I argue that currency-pluralist sufficiency views are better capable of responding to the former than currency-monist views. However, I show that no existing sufficiency view can provide a plausible response to the burden-driven version. Hence, I conclude that the problem of unequal distribution of burdens above the thresholds represents an overlooked threat to the sufficiency view, in any version.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftRes Publica
Vol/bind25
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)21-38
ISSN1356-4765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019

Fingeraftryk

currency
threat
Currency
Burden
Pluralist
Monist

Citer dette

Nielsen, Lasse . / What is wrong with sufficiency?. I: Res Publica. 2019 ; Bind 25, Nr. 1. s. 21-38.
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What is wrong with sufficiency? / Nielsen, Lasse .

I: Res Publica, Bind 25, Nr. 1, 2019, s. 21-38.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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