Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences

Rafael Treibich*

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Abstract

We consider the problem of dividing a perfectly divisible good among individuals who have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness? In a simple model of average externalities, we characterize the class of social preferences which give full priority to the individual with the lowest egalitarian equivalent.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftSocial Choice and Welfare
Vol/bind52
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)1-28
ISSN0176-1714
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019

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