The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games

Birgitte Sloth*

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We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.

TidsskriftGames and Economic Behavior
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)152-169
Antal sider18
StatusUdgivet - 1. jan. 1993
Udgivet eksterntJa

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