Abstract
The analysis departs from the FCC’s stringent proportionality review to elaborate an argument on what intensity of review should be adopted when reviewing the ECB’s economic policies. Building on previous scholarly analyses (Öberg) and relevant Court case law( Spain v Council and Vodafone,) it suggests that the proper standard of proportionality analysis should primarily be guided by the nature of the actions by EU agencies and their relative discretion in taking such actions. This argument suggests that general legislative acts where EU agencies or institutions exercise some discretion should be subject to more deferential review whilst administrative decisions (being characterised by a more limited discretion on part of the institution or agency) should be subject to more intense judicial scrutiny. It concludes that the FCC was thus in principle right to criticise the Court of Justice’s approach to proportionality review of the ECB’s exercise of its discretion.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Publikationsdato | 2020 |
Status | Udgivet - 2020 |
Udgivet eksternt | Ja |