Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860-1938

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Udgivelsesdato: Juni 2009
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Tax and Public Finance
Vol/bind16
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)362-394
ISSN0927-5940
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1. jun. 2009

Fingeraftryk

Voting
Costs
Tax structure
Franchise
Size of government
Tax collection
European countries
Central government
Vote
Income tax
Tax
Personal income tax
Wealth and income
Literacy
Government spending
Taxation

Citer dette

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abstract = "We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.",
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Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860-1938. / Jensen, Peter Sandholt; Aidt, Toke.

I: International Tax and Public Finance, Bind 16, Nr. 3, 01.06.2009, s. 362-394.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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N2 - We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.

AB - We study the consequences of the extension of the voting franchise for the size of (central) government and for the tax structure in ten western European countries, 1860–1938. The main hypothesis under investigation is that the impact of the franchise extension on the tax structure is conditional on tax collection costs. We find that the share of direct taxes (including the personal income tax) is positively affected by the franchise extension, but only if relative tax collection costs are below a given threshold. We use literacy as a proxy for the cost of levying a broad-based income tax. We also show that the gradual relaxation of income and wealth restrictions on the right to vote contributed to growth in total government spending and taxation.

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