Salient Alternatives in Perspective

Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, Joshua Alexander, John Waterman

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both first- and third-person perspective conditions. These include semantic accounts such as contextualism [Lewis 1996; DeRose 2009] and psychological accounts such as the epistemic focal bias account [Gerken 2013, 2017]. In contrast, other psychological accounts, such as the egocentric bias account [Nagel, 2010; Alexander et al. 2014] and the deference account [Turri 2017], only have clear predictions in third-person perspective conditions. Our study provides evidence of a salient alternative effect of the same magnitude in both first and third-person conditions. Thus, the study provides empirical evidence that might help to adjudicate between competing accounts in the literature on salient alternatives.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
ISSN0004-8402
DOI
StatusE-pub ahead of print - 16. jan. 2020

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