Regulation as a political contest: the probability of conservation of a renewable resource

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Abstrakt

How do the levels of extreme positions of various interest groups influence the conservation policies in the context of a renewable resource conservation contest? To answer this question, a model is provided where conservation policy is determined as a contest between two opposing interest groups: one in favor of conservation and another in favor of non-conservation.
The levels of extreme positions for the conservationalists are determined by their demands about the severity of the conservation strategy that needs to be implemented. For the non-conservation group, the level of extreme position is determined by how large the current harvest of the resource should be.
The main driver of the model is that resource conservation is realized only if the conservation group wins the contest, which again depends on the relative gain the two contenders receive when winning the contest. The paper derives conditions where the more extreme positioned groups will have less likelihood of succeeding, e.g., a conservation group demanding larger conservation efforts will face a reduced probability that actual conservation policies will be implemented.
OriginalsprogDansk
TidsskriftEnvironmental Economics
Vol/bind8
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)92-101
ISSN1998-6041
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017

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