Abstract
This article of top civil servants in Danish central and local government
sheds new light on politicization. A survival analysis shows that since
1970, the risk that a top civil servant will be replaced has increased. There
is no evidence of politicization in central government while city managers’
risk of replacement increases both when a new mayor, representing another
party and holding an absolute majority, and when the shift of mayor takes
place within the same party. We interpret these results as evidence of the
adaptability of the merit civil service and political executives’ stronger
insistence on their authority to make discretionary replacements.
sheds new light on politicization. A survival analysis shows that since
1970, the risk that a top civil servant will be replaced has increased. There
is no evidence of politicization in central government while city managers’
risk of replacement increases both when a new mayor, representing another
party and holding an absolute majority, and when the shift of mayor takes
place within the same party. We interpret these results as evidence of the
adaptability of the merit civil service and political executives’ stronger
insistence on their authority to make discretionary replacements.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Governance |
| Vol/bind | 27 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 215-241 |
| ISSN | 0952-1895 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2014 |