Optimal Apportionment

Yukio Koriyama, Jean-Francois Laslier, Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual's own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Political Economy
Vol/bind121
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)584-608
ISSN0022-3808
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2013
Udgivet eksterntJa

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