Epistemic Entitlement – Its Scope and Limits

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Abstrakt

This chapter explores the nature of epistemic entitlement and its role in epistemology in relation to the epistemic internalism-externalism dispute. I argue for epistemic pluralism according to which the genus of epistemic rationality, warrant, harbors two distinct species: an internalist one, justification, and an externalist one, entitlement. On this basis, I advance a new criterion for drawing the distinction between justification and entitlement: The Reason Criterion: entitlements are warrants that do not involve the exercise of the faculty of Reason.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelEpistemic Entitlement
RedaktørerPeter Graham, Nikolaj Pedersen
ForlagOxford University Press
Publikationsdato19. feb. 2020
Sider150-178
Kapitel4
ISBN (Trykt)9780198713524
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 19. feb. 2020

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