Disagreement and Epistemic Injustice from a Communal Perspective

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Abstrakt

The paper is organized as follows: In Section 8.2, I characterize varieties of disagreement as well as the notion of epistemic peerhood. In Section 8.3, I consider a broad argument to the effect that disagreement may defeat or diminish epistemic warrant: The Argument from Self-Doubt. In Section 8.4, I argue that this negative impact of disagreement is more severe than is commonly recognized once we consider the effects of the disagreement at the level of the social group. In Section 8.5, I indicate how the noted epistemological problems with disagreement may breed epistemic injustice in the community. Finally, in Section 8.6, I briefly consider what measures a community may take in order to avoid the noted epistemological problems with disagreement.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelThe Epistemology of Group Disagreement
RedaktørerFernando Broncano-Berracal, J. Adam Carter
UdgivelsesstedNew York
ForlagRoutledge
Publikationsdato2021
Sider139-162
Kapitel8
ISBN (Elektronisk)9780429022500
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2021
NavnRoutledge Studies in Epistemology

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