Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century

Peter Sandholt Jensen, Toke S. Aidt

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

We study the consequences of franchise extension and ballot reform for the size of government in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913. We find that franchise extension exhibits a U-shaped association with revenue per capita and a positive association with spending per capita. Instrumental variables estimates, however, suggest that the U-shaped relationship may be non-causal and our fixed effects estimates point to substantial cross-country heterogeneity. Further, we find that the secret ballot did not matter for tax revenues per capita but might have expanded the size of government relative to GDP.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPublic Choice
Vol/bind157
Udgave nummer3-4
Sider (fra-til)511-542
ISSN0048-5829
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2013

Fingeraftryk

democratization
tax revenue
Western Europe
evidence
revenue
reform
Franchise
Democratization
Size of government
Instrumental variables
Revenue
Fixed effects
Tax revenues

Citer dette

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Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century. / Jensen, Peter Sandholt; Aidt, Toke S.

I: Public Choice, Bind 157, Nr. 3-4, 2013, s. 511-542.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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