Delegation and Motivation

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

In this article we study the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal-agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftTheory and Decision
Vol/bind76
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)363-393
ISSN0040-5833
StatusUdgivet - 2014

Fingeraftryk

laboratory experiment
determinants
experiment
interaction
Experiments
Delegation
Surveys and Questionnaires
Interaction
Laboratory experiments
Decision rights
Experiment
Laboratory Experiments

Citer dette

Borowiecki, K. J., & Angst, L. (2014). Delegation and Motivation. Theory and Decision, 76(3), 363-393.
Borowiecki, Karol Jan ; Angst, Lukas. / Delegation and Motivation. I: Theory and Decision. 2014 ; Bind 76, Nr. 3. s. 363-393.
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Borowiecki, KJ & Angst, L 2014, 'Delegation and Motivation', Theory and Decision, bind 76, nr. 3, s. 363-393.

Delegation and Motivation. / Borowiecki, Karol Jan; Angst, Lukas.

I: Theory and Decision, Bind 76, Nr. 3, 2014, s. 363-393.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

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AU - Borowiecki, Karol Jan

AU - Angst, Lukas

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AB - In this article we study the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal-agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents.

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KW - incentives

KW - experiments

KW - contracts

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