Correction to: Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games (International Journal of Game Theory, (2022), 51, 2, (413-429), 10.1007/s00182-021-00798-6)

Bas Dietzenbacher*, Peter Sudhölter

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Abstract

Theorem 5.1 of the original article is incorrect. In particular, the proofs of weak and converse HM-consistency are wrong. Indeed, the following example shows that, for 0<δ<1, neither the homothetic image of the core with the Shapley value as center and δ as ratio, Cδ, nor its relative interior, riCδ, satisfies weak HM-consistency or converse HM-consistency. In the following example, we use the notation of the original article. We assume that N={1,2,3}⊆U and consider the unanimity game (N, v) on N defined by, for all S⊆N,v(S)=1ifS=N,0otherwise. Let 0<δ<1, put x=2δ+13,1-δ3,1-δ3, and note that x∈Cδ(N,v). Let T={1,2} and assume that x=(xS)S2N\{∅} is an allocation scheme with xN=x and xS∈Cδ(S,vS) for all S∈2N\{∅} such that xT∈Cδ(T,vTx). Then vTx({i})=0 for i=1,2, and vTx(T)=2+δ3. Therefore, (Formula presented.) However, x2=1-δ3<(2+δ)(1-δ)6 so that xT∉Cδ(T,vTx). Similarly, it is shown that, for ε>0 small enough, y:=x+(-2ε,ε,ε)∈riCδ(N,v) and yT∉riCδ(T,vTy) for each allocation scheme y=(yS)S2N\{∅} with yN=y and yS∈riCδ(S,vS) for all S∈2N\{∅}. Theorem 5.1 can be corrected by changing the definition of Cδ into a recursive definition. Let δ∈[0,1] and (N,v)∈Γvex. If |N|≤2, then define Cδ(N,v)=δC(N,v)+(1-δ)ϕ(N,v) (as before). Let k≥3 and assume that Cδ(N,v) has been defined for |N|<k. If |N|=k, then define (Formula presented.) Note that Cδ is the unique smallest subsolution (subject to inclusion) of the core that coincides with Cδ for one- and two-person games and satisfies converse HM-consistency. This definition guarantees that it automatically satisfies weak HM-consistency as well. Moreover, riCδ(N,v) should be replaced by C̲δ(N,v), which is defined as follows. Let δ∈[0,1] and (N,v)∈Γvex. If |N|≤2, then define C̲δ(N,v)=δriC(N,v)+(1-δ)ϕ(N,v). Let k≥3 and assume that C̲δ(N,v) has been defined for |N|<k. If |N|=k, then define (Formula presented.) Similarly, C̲δ is the unique smallest subsolution of the core that coincides with C̲δ for one- and two-person games and satisfies converse HM-consistency. Hence, it satisfies weak HM-consistency as well. Let δ∈[0,1] and (N,v)∈Γvex. Then C̲0(N,v)=C0(N,v)={ϕ(N,v)},C̲1(N,v)=riC1(N,v), and C1(N,v)=C(N,v). Cδ(N,v) and C̲δ(N,v) are bounded (as subsets of the core), contain ϕ(N,v), and are convex (which can be shown by induction on |N|). Cδ(N,v) is closed, hence compact. Cδ and C̲δ satisfy nonemptiness, individual rationality, scale covariance, and superadditivity (which follows again by induction on |N|). C̲0(N,v)=C0(N,v)={ϕ(N,v)},C̲1(N,v)=riC1(N,v), and C1(N,v)=C(N,v). Cδ(N,v) and C̲δ(N,v) are bounded (as subsets of the core), contain ϕ(N,v), and are convex (which can be shown by induction on |N|). Cδ(N,v) is closed, hence compact. Cδ and C̲δ satisfy nonemptiness, individual rationality, scale covariance, and superadditivity (which follows again by induction on |N|). Remark 2 together with a careful inspection of the proof of Theorem 5.1 except the paragraphs on weak and converse HM-consistency show that Theorem 5.1 is correct and the uniqueness part of the proof is left unchanged with the new definition of Cδ and when replacing riCδ by the new C̲δ. Therefore, with the aforementioned new definitions, all statements in Sect. 5 of the original article remain valid. In particular, the examples showing that each of the axioms employed in Theorem 5.1 is logically independent of the remaining axioms can still be used.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind53
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)295-297
ISSN0020-7276
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2024

Bibliografisk note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2024.

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