Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari; Yukihiko Funaki; Peter Sudhölter

doi:10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6

Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari^*
, Yukihiko Funaki
, Peter Sudhölter

^*Kontaktforfatter

Keio University
Waseda University

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

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Abstract

We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Review of Economic Design
Vol/bind	24
Udgave nummer	3-4
Sider (fra-til)	187-197
ISSN	1434-4742
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6
Status	Udgivet - dec. 2020

Finansiering

Toru Hokari received support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant No. KAKENHI 17K03629) and Peter Sudhölter received support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (GrantNo. ECO2015-66803-313 P (MINECO/FEDER)).

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10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6

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Citationsformater

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AU - Sudhölter, Peter

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AB - We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

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DO - 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6

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Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Abstract

Finansiering

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