Business Interests and the Development of the German Welfare State

Thomas Paster

Publikation: Konferencebidrag uden forlag/tidsskriftPaperForskning

Resumé

This chapter analyses the impact of national employers’ associations on the adoption of the main social insurance programs in Germany. The chapter focuses on four programs: work injury insurance, health insurance, old-age and disability pensions, and unemployment insurance. These four programs form the core of the model of the ‘Bismarckian welfare state’, for which Germany became the prototype. After giving a brief overview of the main characteristics of the German welfare state and its historical origins, the chapter analyses the attitudes of German employers towards the adoption of these four programs. Which policy features did German employers support which ones oppose, and why? Did employers’ positions vary across these four programs, and if yes, how? Was support stronger for some programs than for others?

The chapter finds that support was strongest for work injury insurance, and weakest for unemployment insurance, health insurance and old-age pension fall in between. The chapter suggests that differential impact on work incentives best explains this variation. Employers were most opposed to policy provisions that erode work incentives, but more accommodating towards policy provisions that target segments of the population outside of the labor force, like the old and the sick.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdatookt. 2016
Antal sider26
StatusUdgivet - okt. 2016

Fingeraftryk

Welfare state
Employers
Unemployment insurance
Insurance
Germany
Pensions
Health insurance
Work incentives
Old age
Prototype
Social insurance
Labor force

Citer dette

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Business Interests and the Development of the German Welfare State. / Paster, Thomas.

2016.

Publikation: Konferencebidrag uden forlag/tidsskriftPaperForskning

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