Boundless Nature

Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/konference-proceedingBidrag til bog/antologiForskningpeer review

Resumé

In this chapter, I am concerned with the attempt to naturalize ethics found in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and represented amongst other by the work of John McDowell, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. I depart from a distinction between three forms of naturalism, hard or scientific naturalism, liberal naturalism and unrestricted or absolute naturalism, which I use to show how neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists place themselves within a liberal form of naturalism in order to develop an account of the virtues as indeed natural. In the main part of the chapter, I argue, on the one hand, that there is a point of affinity between this endeavour and the approach to nature found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and, on the other, that a Wittgensteinian naturalism still differs from the liberal naturalism adopted in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in one crucial respect, namely by being unrestricted. Finally, I will make a call for an adoption of this form of naturalism in virtue ethics and argue that this will fundamentally alter the way we ought to approach the virtues in moral philosophy.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelEthics in the Wake of Wittgenstein
RedaktørerBenjamin de Mesel, Oskari Kuusela
Udgivelses stedNew York
ForlagRoutledge
Publikationsdato2019
Sider63-83
Kapitel3
ISBN (Trykt)9781138744295
ISBN (Elektronisk)9781315181172
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2019
NavnRoutledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory

Fingeraftryk

Naturalism
Virtue Ethics
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Nature
Aristotelian
Philosophy
John McDowell
Moral philosophy
Ethicists
Scientific Naturalism
Affinity

Emneord

  • Wittgenstein, Ethics, Naturalism, Virtue Ethics

Citer dette

Christensen, A-M. S. (2019). Boundless Nature: Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. I B. de Mesel, & O. Kuusela (red.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein (s. 63-83). New York: Routledge. Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315181172-4
Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard. / Boundless Nature : Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. red. / Benjamin de Mesel ; Oskari Kuusela. New York : Routledge, 2019. s. 63-83 (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory).
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Christensen, A-MS 2019, Boundless Nature: Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. i B de Mesel & O Kuusela (red), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. Routledge, New York, Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory, s. 63-83. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315181172-4

Boundless Nature : Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. / Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard.

Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. red. / Benjamin de Mesel; Oskari Kuusela. New York : Routledge, 2019. s. 63-83 (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory).

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/konference-proceedingBidrag til bog/antologiForskningpeer review

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N2 - In this chapter, I am concerned with the attempt to naturalize ethics found in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and represented amongst other by the work of John McDowell, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. I depart from a distinction between three forms of naturalism, hard or scientific naturalism, liberal naturalism and unrestricted or absolute naturalism, which I use to show how neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists place themselves within a liberal form of naturalism in order to develop an account of the virtues as indeed natural. In the main part of the chapter, I argue, on the one hand, that there is a point of affinity between this endeavour and the approach to nature found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and, on the other, that a Wittgensteinian naturalism still differs from the liberal naturalism adopted in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in one crucial respect, namely by being unrestricted. Finally, I will make a call for an adoption of this form of naturalism in virtue ethics and argue that this will fundamentally alter the way we ought to approach the virtues in moral philosophy.

AB - In this chapter, I am concerned with the attempt to naturalize ethics found in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and represented amongst other by the work of John McDowell, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. I depart from a distinction between three forms of naturalism, hard or scientific naturalism, liberal naturalism and unrestricted or absolute naturalism, which I use to show how neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists place themselves within a liberal form of naturalism in order to develop an account of the virtues as indeed natural. In the main part of the chapter, I argue, on the one hand, that there is a point of affinity between this endeavour and the approach to nature found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and, on the other, that a Wittgensteinian naturalism still differs from the liberal naturalism adopted in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in one crucial respect, namely by being unrestricted. Finally, I will make a call for an adoption of this form of naturalism in virtue ethics and argue that this will fundamentally alter the way we ought to approach the virtues in moral philosophy.

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Christensen A-MS. Boundless Nature: Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. I de Mesel B, Kuusela O, red., Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. New York: Routledge. 2019. s. 63-83. (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315181172-4