Resumé
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Titel | Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein |
| Redaktører | Benjamin de Mesel, Oskari Kuusela |
| Udgivelses sted | New York |
| Forlag | Routledge |
| Publikationsdato | 2019 |
| Sider | 63-83 |
| Kapitel | 3 |
| ISBN (Trykt) | 9781138744295 |
| ISBN (Elektronisk) | 9781315181172 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2019 |
| Navn | Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory |
|---|
Fingeraftryk
Emneord
- Wittgenstein, Ethics, Naturalism, Virtue Ethics
Citer dette
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Boundless Nature : Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism. / Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard.
Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein. red. / Benjamin de Mesel; Oskari Kuusela. New York : Routledge, 2019. s. 63-83 (Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory).Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport/konference-proceeding › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › peer review
TY - CHAP
T1 - Boundless Nature
T2 - Virtue Ethics, Wittgenstein and Unrestricted Naturalism
AU - Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In this chapter, I am concerned with the attempt to naturalize ethics found in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and represented amongst other by the work of John McDowell, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. I depart from a distinction between three forms of naturalism, hard or scientific naturalism, liberal naturalism and unrestricted or absolute naturalism, which I use to show how neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists place themselves within a liberal form of naturalism in order to develop an account of the virtues as indeed natural. In the main part of the chapter, I argue, on the one hand, that there is a point of affinity between this endeavour and the approach to nature found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and, on the other, that a Wittgensteinian naturalism still differs from the liberal naturalism adopted in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in one crucial respect, namely by being unrestricted. Finally, I will make a call for an adoption of this form of naturalism in virtue ethics and argue that this will fundamentally alter the way we ought to approach the virtues in moral philosophy.
AB - In this chapter, I am concerned with the attempt to naturalize ethics found in contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and represented amongst other by the work of John McDowell, Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. I depart from a distinction between three forms of naturalism, hard or scientific naturalism, liberal naturalism and unrestricted or absolute naturalism, which I use to show how neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists place themselves within a liberal form of naturalism in order to develop an account of the virtues as indeed natural. In the main part of the chapter, I argue, on the one hand, that there is a point of affinity between this endeavour and the approach to nature found in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and, on the other, that a Wittgensteinian naturalism still differs from the liberal naturalism adopted in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in one crucial respect, namely by being unrestricted. Finally, I will make a call for an adoption of this form of naturalism in virtue ethics and argue that this will fundamentally alter the way we ought to approach the virtues in moral philosophy.
KW - Wittgenstein, Ethics, Naturalism, Virtue Ethics
U2 - 10.4324/9781315181172-4
DO - 10.4324/9781315181172-4
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 9781138744295
SP - 63
EP - 83
BT - Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein
A2 - de Mesel, Benjamin
A2 - Kuusela, Oskari
PB - Routledge
CY - New York
ER -