Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

José Manuel Giménez-Gómez; Peter Sudhölter; Cori Vilella

doi:10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y

Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

José Manuel Giménez-Gómez^*, Peter Sudhölter, Cori Vilella

^*Kontaktforfatter

Rovira i Virgili University

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

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Abstract

A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Vol/bind	97
Udgave nummer	3
Sider (fra-til)	383-390
ISSN	1432-2994
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y
Status	Udgivet - jun. 2023

Bibliografisk note

Funding Information:
We thank Carles Rafels for helpful comments and suggestions at the beginning of this work. Financial support from Grant PID2020-119152GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 is acknowledged.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s).

Dokumenter og links

10.1007/s00186-023-00819-yLicens: CC BY

Open Access VersionForlagets udgivne version, 239 KBLicens: CC BY

Citationsformater

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note = "Funding Information: We thank Carles Rafels for helpful comments and suggestions at the beginning of this work. Financial support from Grant PID2020-119152GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 is acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023, The Author(s).",

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AU - Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel

AU - Sudhölter, Peter

AU - Vilella, Cori

N1 - Funding Information: We thank Carles Rafels for helpful comments and suggestions at the beginning of this work. Financial support from Grant PID2020-119152GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 is acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: © 2023, The Author(s).

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N2 - A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.

AB - A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative vector according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector.

KW - Average monotonicity

KW - Core

KW - Nontransferable utility

KW - Population monotonicity

U2 - 10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y

DO - 10.1007/s00186-023-00819-y

M3 - Journal article

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SP - 383

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JO - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

JF - Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

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ER -

Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

Abstract

Bibliografisk note

Dokumenter og links

Fingeraftryk

Citationsformater