Birgitte Sloth

Erhverv og økonomi

1. Sequential Equilibrium 100%
2. Belief Functions 95%
3. Extensive Form Games 88%
4. Lower Probabilities 73%
5. Decentralized Trade 54%
6. Expected Utility 53%
7. Intransitivity 48%
8. Allais Paradox 48%
9. Fictitious Play 48%
10. Evolutionary Learning 48%
11. Bargaining Set 47%
12. Signaling Games 42%
13. Separating Equilibrium 41%
14. Economics 41%
15. Equilibrium Selection 41%
16. Adaptive Learning 41%
17. Learning Process 38%
18. Non-cooperative Game 37%
19. Incomplete Information 32%
20. Voting 31%
21. Violations 29%
22. Expected Utility Theory 28%
23. Nash Equilibrium 27%
24. Testing 26%
25. World Economy 25%
26. Seller 25%
27. Uncertainty 24%
28. Solution Concepts 24%
29. Buyers 24%
30. Financial Crisis 23%
31. Uncertainty Aversion 22%
32. Strategic Form Game 22%
33. Equilibrium Price 22%
34. Neutrality 16%
35. Global Financial Crisis 16%
36. Bilateral Bargaining 15%
37. Alternatives 14%
38. Preannouncements 14%
39. Sequential Decisions 13%
40. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 12%
41. Modeling 12%
42. Discount Factor 12%
43. Asset Markets 11%
44. Bounded Rationality 11%
45. Social Context 11%
46. Trembling-Hand Perfect Equilibrium 10%
47. Observer 10%
48. Decision Rules 10%
49. Vote 10%
50. Finance 10%