Aktivitet: Foredrag og mundtlige bidrag › Konferenceoplæg
We propose an experimental eye-tracking study of how strategic sophistication is shaped by experience in the contest of two-person normal-form games. Although strategic sophistication has been shown to be linked to a variety of endogenous and exogenous factors, little is known about how it is shaped by experience with previous interactive decisions. Whereas we show that payoff feedback in previous games can importantly influence strategic sophistication, we also show that games that provide theoretically equivalent learning opportunities can produce substantially different learning outcomes. Specifically, only feedback associated with repeated play of games that emphasize strategic interdependence (i.e., those in which the participants do not have a dominant strategy) enhances strategic learning, as demonstrated by the observed increased frequency of equilibrium play and the evolved way of collecting–and then processing–payoff information. Moreover, subgroups of individuals respond to experience in remarkably different ways. Whereas some players eventually learn to visually analyze the payoff matrix compatibly with an underlying equilibrium reasoning, others appear to use experience with previous interactions to devise simple heuristics of play. Our results have implications for theoretical and computational modeling in economics and Artificial Intelligence research.