Beskrivelse
Compliance and enforcement are important issues from an economic point of view since regulatory measures are useless without a certain level of enforcement. These conclusions come from a well-established theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement problems within fisheries. Contrary, almost no empirical investigations exist. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the compliance and enforcement in the empirical case of a mixed trawl fishery after Norway lobster in Kattegat and Skagerrak. The paper presents results from two simulation models to the case study; one for single output and single enforcement tool and one for multiple outputs and multiple enforcement tools, respectively. The results from the simulation models are compared to the baseline case defined as the enforcement situation in the baseline year. The paper discusses the consequences of policy intervention on the level of compliance and the private and social benefits from varying enforcement intensity, penalties and management measures and combination of these.| Periode | 2. okt. 2009 |
|---|---|
| Begivenhedstitel | An Empirical Investigation of Compliance and Enforcement Problems |
| Begivenhedstype | Konference |
| Arrangør | FOI |
| Placering | Københavns Universitet, DanmarkVis på kort |